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THIS IS WHAT DEMOCRACY LOOKS LIKE:
TITLE IX AND THE LEGITIMACY OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
Samuel R. Bagenstos*
THE TRANSFORMATION OF TITLE IX: REGULATING GENDER
EQUALITY IN EDUCATION. By R. Shep Melnick. Washington, D.C.:
Brookings Institution Press. 2018. Pp. 325. $35.99.
We are, once again, in the middle of a battle over the legitimacy of the
administrative state. 1 An increasingly vocal band of scholars criticizes administrative agencies as unaccountable, elitist, captured, and implementing
bad policy. 2 The more populist elements of the Trump Administration’s
rhetoric have taken this critique to a broader audience, to great political effect. 3 Though the picture is complex, the Roberts Court has appeared sympathetic to important aspects of the critique. 4

* Frank G. Millard Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School.
1. See generally Gillian E. Metzger, The Supreme Court, 2016 Term—Foreword: 1930s
Redux: The Administrative State Under Siege, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1 (2017).
2. See id. at 31–33 (collecting numerous examples).
3. See, e.g., Evan Osnos, Trump vs. the “Deep State,” NEW YORKER (May 14, 2018),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/05/21/trump-vs-the-deep-state [https://perma.cc
/RT43-A4K7] (“Trump got to Washington by promising to unmake the political ecosystem,
eradicating the existing species and populating it anew. This project has gone by various
names: Stephen Bannon, the campaign chief, called it the ‘deconstruction of the administrative
state’—the undoing of regulations, pacts, and taxes that he believed constrain American power.
In Presidential tweets and on Fox News, the mission is described as a war on the ‘deep state,’
the permanent power élite.”). For a good recent assessment of the Trump Administration’s
legal efforts in this area, see Kathy Wagner Hill, The State of the Administrative State: The Regulatory Impact of the Trump Administration, 6 EMORY CORP. GOVERNANCE &
ACCOUNTABILITY REV. 25 (2019).
4. For a careful description of the many ways in which recent doctrine has reflected a
distrust of the administrative state, see Metzger, supra note 1, at 17–31. It is true that the Roberts Court has been less than maximally aggressive in seeking to roll back the administrative
state. In Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019), for example, the Court, by a 5–4 vote, refused
to overrule prior cases like Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997), which demand deference to
an agency’s reasonable interpretation of its regulations. But Kisor narrowed Auer in the same
breath that it reaffirmed that decision. See Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2414–18 (extensively highlighting
the limits of Auer deference). Just a week earlier, Justice Gorsuch, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas, argued in favor of reviving a robust constitutional non-delegation
doctrine. See Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2133–42 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
Justice Alito expressed a willingness to “support th[e] effort” to revive the non-delegation doctrine if there were five votes on the Court for doing so. Id. at 2131 (Alito, J., concurring in the
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Agencies enforcing civil rights laws—and particularly the Department of
Education’s Office for Civil Rights (OCR)—have been a principal target of
the critics of the administrative state. 5 The heat on OCR increased with the
Obama Administration’s aggressive efforts to enforce Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972. The Obama-era OCR’s policies on campus sexual
assault and the rights of transgender students drew substantial blowback. 6
With The Transformation of Title IX, R. Shep Melnick 7 steps into this
fight—and he takes the side of those who find OCR’s actions illegitimate.
Melnick is a leading right-of-center scholar of regulation and the administrative state. In this book, he takes on the administration of Title IX. He focuses
on three especially controversial contexts in which the courts and OCR have
applied the statute: intercollegiate athletics, campus sexual harassment and
assault, and the treatment of transgender students in elementary and secondary schools. He argues that OCR and the courts have, through a process
of “institutional leapfrogging,” steadily adopted more and more intrusive
rules governing educational entities (pp. 6, 14, 15, 90, 152, 232, 243–44, 253,
255). He contends that these rules are highly contestable and neither specifically required by the statutory text nor envisioned by the statute’s drafters
(p. 22). But, he argues, the leapfrogging process—in which the agency pushes
forward, then the courts go a bit farther than the agency, then the agency
goes even a bit farther, and so on—has enabled these massive innovations in
the law to fly under the radar and evade democratic checks or debate
(p. 251). OCR’s reliance on subregulatory guidance rather than notice-andcomment rulemaking has in his view facilitated the achievement of that result (p. 243). He concludes that “the evolution of Title IX raises fundamental
questions about control, accountability, and legitimacy within a constitutional democracy” (p. 22).
The book offers an important take on some issues of high public salience. It reflects a detailed immersion in the operations of OCR, as well as a
strong understanding of the legal doctrinal issues. But the book’s thesis is
fundamentally misguided. OCR has not subverted or evaded democracy. Rather, the agency has served as a catalyst for democratic debate, a forum in
which that debate has played out, and an implementer of the will of the peo-

judgment). Justice Kavanaugh—the obvious fifth vote—did not participate in Gundy. See Jeannie Suk Gersen, The Supreme Court Is One Vote Away from Changing How the U.S. Is Governed, NEW YORKER (July 3, 2019), https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/thesupreme-court-is-one-vote-away-from-changing-how-the-us-is-governed
[https://perma.cc
/H8RH-SSGH] (“Kavanaugh’s absence from the case likely changed its outcome.”).
5. See, e.g., David E. Bernstein, Antidiscrimination Laws and the Administrative State:
A Skeptic’s Look at Administrative Constitutionalism, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1381, 1387–92
(2019) [hereinafter Bernstein, Antidiscrimination Laws]; David E. Bernstein, The Abuse of Executive Power: Getting Beyond the Streetlight Effect, 11 FLA. INT’L U. L. REV. 289, 290–98 (2016)
[hereinafter Bernstein, Abuse of Executive Power]; Jeremy Rabkin, Office for Civil Rights, in
THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 304 (James Q. Wilson ed., 1980).
6. See infra text accompanying notes 20–30.
7. Thomas P. O’Neill, Jr. Professor of American Politics, Boston College.
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ple. The Title IX experience, I argue, supports the claim made by some
scholars that administrative agencies can be a key locus of democratic deliberation over the scope of basic rights. 8
When OCR’s approaches have become entrenched in the law—as in the
case of intercollegiate athletics—it is because those approaches, which may
be controversial, nonetheless earn the support of the public and important
political actors. But the often-harsh public reaction to OCR’s efforts on sexual assault and transgender rights demonstrates that the agency cannot sidestep political debates where such a strong public consensus is not yet availaavailable. In these contexts, far from preempting democratic politics, the
agency becomes a venue for democratic deliberation and debate. I elaborate
on these points in Part I below.
In Part II, I dig into the specific procedural critiques Melnick offers. I
show that OCR’s reliance on subregulatory guidance has not evaded democratic checks. And I argue that Melnick’s claim of “institutional leapfrogging” is probably not correct—and that, in any event, any “leapfrogging” that
has occurred has been fully consistent with democratic deliberation.
I should note that this brief Review focuses on Melnick’s procedural argument—that OCR’s actions subvert democratic decisionmaking. The book
is also plainly driven by substantive disagreement with OCR in each of the
areas it discusses. Melnick makes clear that he believes that OCR has put too
much of an emphasis on gender parity in intercollegiate athletics, 9 that the
agency has adopted a too intrusive and victim-protective regime for campus
sexual assault, 10 and that it should not be dictating which bathrooms schools
may allow transgender students to use. 11 This brief Review is not the place to
respond to those arguments on the merits. But it will not come as a surprise
to readers that I take a different view than does Melnick on these matters. 12

8. See Olatunde C.A. Johnson, Overreach and Innovation in Equality Regulation, 66
DUKE L.J. 1771 (2017); Bertrall L. Ross II, Administering Suspect Classes, 66 DUKE L.J. 1807
(2017); Bertrall L. Ross II, Embracing Administrative Constitutionalism, 95 B.U. L. REV. 519
(2015).
9. See p. 78.
10. See p. 200.
11. See p. 231.
12. I defended the substance of the Obama-era OCR’s guidelines on campus sexual assault and harassment in Samuel R. Bagenstos, What Went Wrong with Title IX?, WASH.
MONTHLY (Sept./Oct. 2015), https://washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/septoct-2015/whatwent-wrong-with-title-ix/ [https://perma.cc/DF7E-LQG2]. I defended the Obama-era OCR’s
approach to transgender rights in Brief for Professors Samuel Bagenstos et al. as Amici Curiae
in Support of Respondent, Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. v. G.G. ex rel. Grimm, 137 S. Ct. 1239
(2017) (No. 16-273), 2017 WL 894898.
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THE VIEW FROM 30,000 FEET: EXPLAINING THE PATTERN OF POLICY
OUTPUTS

Melnick argues that OCR has evaded democratic checks by pursuing
major policy through enforcement actions and subregulatory guidance, and
that the courts have aided and abetted the agency through a below-the-radar
process of “institutional leapfrogging.” He supports this claim by digging into institutional detail. He pursues the various agency and court actions in
each of his three policy areas of focus and identifies a variety of moments in
which OCR failed to pursue a more overt strategy of policy change.
Melnick’s close-to-the-ground approach has a real value, and one cannot fully refute his argument without taking it on its terms. I attempt to do
that in Part II below. But we can gain a useful reality check by taking a wider-angle view. If we look at the overall pattern of policy outputs in Melnick’s
three areas of focus, does that pattern suggest that OCR and the courts have
evaded democratic checks?
The answer, I would submit, is no. Melnick discusses three policy areas.
In one of them—athletics—OCR’s approach has become entrenched over
many decades across several presidential administrations. In the others—
sexual harassment and the rights of transgender students—the Obama Administration’s OCR took a much more aggressive approach than the agency
had in the past, its actions provoked significant judicial resistance, and the
Trump Administration largely reversed course. This pattern demonstrates
responsiveness to, not insulation from, public opinion.
Melnick asserts that Title IX’s regulation of college athletics has only
“seldom” been accompanied by “sustained debate over the meaning of
equality or the purpose of athletics in the educational setting” (p. 88). Rather,
he says, policymaking has expanded through steady accretion “by administrators and judges who almost always claim they are just following previously established policy” (p. 88). This process, he argues, “narrowed the political
debate” and hid the true stakes from the public (p. 144). Yet Melnick himself
identifies numerous occasions through the years in which the statute’s application to athletics was a prominent subject of public legislative and administrative debate.
During the period in which the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare (HEW) was drafting its initial Title IX regulations in the early 1970s,
Congress specifically addressed the athletics issue. Senator John Tower proposed to amend the statute to exempt “revenue-generating” sports, but the
Senate rejected that proposal (p. 94). Instead, Congress adopted the so-called
Javits Amendment, which required the Secretary to issue Title IX regulations
that included “with respect to intercollegiate athletic activities reasonable
provisions considering the nature of particular sports.” 13 When President
Ford’s HEW Secretary issued those regulations in 1975, the House Education

13. Education Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-380, § 844, 88 Stat. 484, 612 (1974);
see p. 94.
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and Labor Committee held hearings to evaluate them. 14 But neither house of
Congress exercised its pre-Chadha 15 legislative veto authority. 16 It is true that
President Carter’s HEW Secretary refused to submit a further set of athletic
guidelines to Congress for approval in 1978 (p. 97). But that hardly kept the
issue out of public political debate. When Congress passed the Civil Rights
Restoration Act in 1988, to overturn the Supreme Court’s Grove City 17 case
and extend Title IX’s protections across an entire university that receives
federal funds, the floor debates indicated “that the enactment was aimed, in
part, at creating a more level playing field for female athletes.” 18 George
H.W. Bush assumed the presidency the next year. His administration “announced that it would make enforcement of Title IX one of its top priorities”
and “backed its words with action” (p. 103). President Clinton’s OCR did the
same (p. 105).
Although some Republican members of Congress who served in the new
Gingrich majority sought to “rewrite Title IX to reverse OCR and the
courts,” Melnick notes that they “got nowhere” (p. 120). Public opinion
stood firmly in favor of the use of Title IX to expand women’s athletic opportunities, even if that policy imposed costs on men’s sports. “A 2000 Wall
Street Journal/NBC poll found that 70 percent of Republicans and 79 percent
of Democrats approved of ‘cutting back on men’s athletics to ensure equivalent athletic opportunity for women.’ ” 19 When the George W. Bush Administration tried to roll back athletics enforcement a few years later, it found
itself forced to back away in the face of political pressure (pp. 120–22).
Title IX’s application to intercollegiate athletics hardly looks like a case
in which a backroom bureaucratic cabal, with the aid of a willing judiciary,
snuck one past the American people. Rather, it looks like a case in which the
American people got what they wanted. The issue was prominent, it was
fought out in the open on repeated occasions for a number of years, and the
supporters of expanded varsity athletic opportunities for women won.
The other two areas discussed by Melnick offer useful points of comparison. With regard to campus sexual assault, the Obama Administration took
a particularly aggressive enforcement posture—one that was highly visible to
the public (pp. 197–98). As Melnick notes, the administration introduced the
new posture in a 2011 Dear Colleague letter “announced at a well-publicized
14. See Sex Discrimination Regulations: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Postsecondary
Educ. of the H. Comm. on Educ. & Labor, 94th Cong. (1975).
15. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
16. See McCormick v. Sch. Dist. of Mamaroneck, 370 F.3d 275, 287 (2d Cir. 2004).
17. Grove City Coll. v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984).
18. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 894 (1st Cir. 1993) (collecting examples); see
also McCormick, 370 F.3d at 287–88 (“The congressional debate leading to the passage of this
statute demonstrates concern by members of Congress about ensuring equal opportunities for
female athletes.”).
19. P. 120 (quoting Welch Suggs, Most Americans Favor Cutting Men’s Sports to Add
Women’s, Poll Finds, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (June 23, 2000), https://www.chronicle.com
/article/Most-Americans-Favor-Cutting/106684 (on file with the Michigan Law Review)).
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event” that included speeches from Vice President Biden and Secretary of
Education Duncan (pp. 152–53). The administration consolidated that aggressive posture by issuing a new OCR guidance document in 2014—
guidance accompanied by an extensive report from a presidential task force
and a statement from President Obama himself (pp. 149–51).
The Obama Administration’s approach drew equally aggressive, and
equally public, pushback—including in the Republican Party’s 2016 platform. 20 Once it was in office, the Trump Administration quickly withdrew
the relevant OCR guidance documents from the Obama Administration
(p. 222). And in November 2018 it issued proposed rules that would mark a
dramatic change from the prior administration by increasing protections for
those accused of sexual assault. 21
Is this an example of bureaucrats subverting the democratic process? If
so, which bureaucrats? Those who worked in the Obama Administration?
Or those who worked in the Trump Administration? As Karen Tani shows,
the Obama Administration’s actions involving campus sexual assault capped
decades of work by social movement activists who organized to oppose violence against women. 22 Those activists achieved major success through the
legislative process by securing the enactment of the Violence Against Women Act. 23 But the Supreme Court invalidated that statute’s key remedies in
United States v. Morrison. 24 Tani aptly notes that Morrison “left a shell of a
statute: VAWA remained standing (largely in the form of funding streams
for violence prevention, victims’ services, and law enforcement), but the aspirations at its core had received a significant blow.” 25
Activists fighting campus sexual assault thus secured support for their
agenda from a majority of elected legislators, only to have their victory taken
away by a 5–4 majority of unelected judges on the Supreme Court. Then, after the election of a president and vice president who supported their cause,
those activists, backed by a “robust grassroots movement,” 26 turned to the
administrative process to help secure the same goal. Once President Trump
was elected, though, things changed. Although there was “no coherent grassroots social movement [that sought] to undo OCR’s work on college campuses” 27—only elite organizations like the Foundation for Individual Rights
20. See Jake New, Trump, Clinton and Sex Assault, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Oct. 11, 2016),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2016/10/11/approaches-campus-sexual-assault-woulddiffer-under-trump-clinton [https://perma.cc/X9H9-X6VF].
21. See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving Federal Financial Assistance, 83 Fed. Reg. 61,462 (proposed Nov. 29, 2018) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 106).
22. See Karen M. Tani, An Administrative Right to Be Free from Sexual Violence? Title
IX Enforcement in Historical and Institutional Perspective, 66 DUKE L.J. 1847, 1854–78 (2017).
23. See id. at 1859–60.
24. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
25. Tani, supra note 22, at 1863 (footnote omitted).
26. Id. at 1875.
27. Id. at 1896.

April 2020]

This Is What Democracy Looks Like

1059

in Education—the Trump Administration quickly acted to reverse the
Obama-era policies.
Rather than being hidden from the public in the obscurity of bureaucratic hallways, OCR’s actions involving sexual violence on campus were the
subject of significant political debate. And far from displacing the debate
over the issue, the agency was a key subject of that debate—and a key arena
in which interested members of the public mobilized to achieve their policy
goals. If anything, the Obama Administration’s aggressive efforts to enforce
Title IX against sexual violence on campus would thus seem to have more
democratic legitimacy than the Trump Administration’s retrenchment. But
either way, the shifting administrative positions represented the democratic
process in action.
When we look at Title IX protections for transgender students, we find a
similar story: The Obama Administration took an aggressive and new enforcement posture. That posture was part of a broader policy of advancing
the rights of transgender persons—one that was not limited to Title IX or
education. 28 The Obama Administration’s efforts to advance transgender
rights, both in and out of education, caused significant political controversy.
As Melnick notes, they “became front-page news in 2016 when the Department of Justice filed suit against the state of North Carolina, which had recently enacted legislation requiring that access to public restrooms be deterdetermined solely by the sex listed on an individual’s birth certificate”
(p. 226). When Donald Trump became president, his administration quickly
reversed course on the Obama Administration’s approach, in and out of the
education context. 29 Again, nothing was hidden from the public. And the
public responded. Although the last chapter of the story of transgender
rights in the United States will not be written for some time to come, OCR’s
shifting positions on the issue across administrations reflect a persistent divide in public opinion. 30
From 30,000 feet, then, Melnick’s cases do not seem to fit the story of
bureaucrats and judges subverting the democratic process. Rather, the more

28. See p. 226 (noting that OCR’s efforts were “one part of an administration-wide effort
to extend coverage of Title VII and Title IX to transgender employees and students”); Equal
Access to Housing in HUD Programs Regardless of Sexual Orientation or Gender Identity, 77
Fed. Reg. 5662 (Feb. 3, 2012) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pts. 5, 200, 203, 236, 400, 570, 574,
882, 891, 982) (protecting against gender identity discrimination in HUD programs); Nondiscrimination in Health Programs and Activities, 81 Fed. Reg. 31,376, 31,471–72 (May 18, 2016)
(to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 92) (interpreting section 1557 of the Affordable Care Act to protect against discrimination based on gender identity).
29. See, e.g., Zack Ford, Trump Just Dismantled One of the Last Major Protections Keeping Transgender People Safe, THINK PROGRESS (May 24, 2019, 2:19 PM), https://thinkprogress
.org/trump-administration-targets-last-major-transgender-protection-section-1557-80d1ce66
4424/ [https://perma.cc/FC3R-7JZQ].
30. See, e.g., Anna Brown, Republicans, Democrats Have Starkly Different Views on
Transgender Issues, PEW RES. CTR.: FACT TANK (Nov. 8, 2017), https://www.pewresearch.org
/fact-tank/2017/11/08/transgender-issues-divide-republicans-and-democrats/ [https://perma
.cc/EN2N-X9F6].
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apt story appears to be one of democratic deliberation and political responsiveness. As Melnick himself acknowledges, “since the creation of the Department of Education in 1980, OCR has rarely been out of step with the
department secretary, the White House staff, or the Department of Justice”
(p. 252).
II.

THE VIEW FROM THE GROUND: ASSESSING THE PROCEDURAL CRITIQUE

From closer to the ground, things look no better for Melnick’s illegitimacy argument. Melnick makes two connected arguments that OCR and the
courts have employed a process that has evaded democratic checks. More
narrowly, he argues that OCR has “sidestep[ped]” the administrative-law
“constraints” designed “to ensure that administrators consult a wide array of
interests, gather data on both the costs and benefits of regulation, consider
alternative approaches for addressing the problem, and explain their policy
in a way that is accessible to attentive publics and reviewing judges”
(pp. 242–43). Most notably, the agency “almost never uses notice-andcomment rulemaking” but instead relies on guidance documents, Dear Colleague Letters, and similar informal pronouncements to set forth its views of
what the statute requires (p. 243). More broadly, he argues that “judges and
administrators have bestowed upon themselves the authority to ‘update’—
read amend—Title IX through the opaque forms of institutional leapfrogging” (p. 243). Neither the narrow nor the broad argument, though, establishes democratic illegitimacy here.
A. The Reliance on Subregulatory Guidance
Take the narrow argument first. Melnick joins a number of others who
have challenged OCR’s reliance on subregulatory letters and guidance documents to make policy statements. 31 They contend that these subregulatory
documents have purported to impose requirements not demanded by the
statute or its implementing regulations; that OCR has threatened to withhold
federal funds from universities that do not comply with them; and that those
institutions have predictably knuckled under. As Professors Gersen and Suk
put it (speaking about sexual assault on campus specifically), OCR thus
“achieved complete compliance with its nonbinding guidance document
without ever having to defend its reasoning through public comments or judicial review.” 32
It’s worth unpacking this claim. Everybody seems to acknowledge that
OCR’s subregulatory statements are not binding law in any formal sense. A
school could not be held liable, or have its federal funds withheld, simply for
violating those statements. It is only the violation of the statute or its imple31. See Bernstein, Antidiscrimination Laws, supra note 5, at 1387–88; Bernstein, Abuse
of Executive Power, supra note 5, at 290–98; Jacob Gersen & Jeannie Suk, The Sex Bureaucracy,
104 CALIF. L. REV. 881 (2016).
32. Gersen & Suk, supra note 31, at 909.
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menting regulations that could lead to liability or withholding. And such a
violation would have to be established in an administrative proceeding
brought by OCR, with full judicial review of any legal question, 33 or in a private suit brought by an injured party, in which the court would ultimately
decide what the law was. OCR simply does not have unchecked power to rewrite the requirements of Title IX. A school can always defend itself against a
claim and insist that a court decide whether the agency’s interpretation was
correct. 34
Some of the critics assert that OCR can effectively bully schools into not
defending themselves, because “the threat of lost federal funds is a big stick
to wield.” 35 To the contrary, as Melnick himself concludes, “eventually it became clear to almost everyone that the threat was an empty one.” 36 Federal
agencies in general—and OCR in particular—virtually never cut off federal
funds in response to violations of the antidiscrimination conditions Congress has placed on that spending. 37 The major exception to this trend occurred during efforts to promote racial desegregation in elementary and
secondary schools during the late 1960s. 38 But even in those cases, OCR
quickly reversed the overwhelming majority of funding cut-offs—despite little progress toward compliance in many cases. 39 And as Melnick notes, “the

33. Gersen and Suk acknowledge the point. See id. (“To take away a school’s federal
funding, OCR would be statutorily required to hold a hearing and explain the precise way in
which the school had failed to comply with a Title IX obligation. That explanation and legal
analysis could be challenged in court and a judge would evaluate whether the interpretation
and policy judgment articulated in OCR’s reasoning was consistent with Title IX and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The fact that the school deviated from the DCL itself could
not be treated as a per se Title IX violation.” (footnotes omitted)).
34. See Blake Emerson, The Claims of Official Reason: Administrative Guidance on Social Inclusion, 128 YALE L.J. 2122, 2179 (2019) (“[T]he agency’s use of the guidance in complaint investigations and settlements was not dispositive of whether the agency would allow a
party the opportunity to contest its interpretations in an adjudicatory enforcement proceeding.
To the contrary, the statutory and administrative enforcement scheme clearly contemplates an
opportunity to contest the agency’s legal interpretation in such a proceeding.”).
35. See Gersen & Suk, supra note 31, at 909. Melnick notes that the Obama Administration’s Assistant Secretary of Education for Civil Rights, Catherine Lhamon, threatened to take
away federal education funds from institutions that failed to comply with the requirements set
forth in OCR’s subregulatory guidance concerning sexual assault but that she “never actually
pulled the trigger on the funding cutoff.” P. 151.
36. P. 47; see also Samuel R. Bagenstos, Spending Clause Litigation in the Roberts Court,
58 DUKE L.J. 345, 409 (2008) (stating that “the threat that federal funds will be withheld is remote at best”).
37. See, e.g., STEPHEN C. HALPERN, ON THE LIMITS OF THE LAW: THE IRONIC LEGACY OF
TITLE VI OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 294–95 (1995) (noting OCR’s reluctance under administrations of both political parties to use the fund-termination sanction); Eloise Pasachoff,
Agency Enforcement of Spending Clause Statutes: A Defense of the Funding Cut-Off, 124 YALE
L.J. 248, 252–53 (2014) (noting that funding terminations are extremely rare).
38. See Pasachoff, supra note 37, at 252.
39. See p. 47.
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federal government has never terminated funding to educational institutions
for violating Title IX.” 40
If the threat of funding termination is an empty one, how did the
Obama-era OCR bully universities into giving up the fight? Melnick argues
that the agency did so by prominently announcing its investigations, thus
creating public relations problems for the agency’s targets, and by ensuring
that the investigations would be both extensive and expensive to defend.
This combination, he contends, “put enormous pressure on schools to reach
legally binding settlements with OCR.” 41 Gersen and Suk similarly argue that
schools settle in significant part “because the political climate makes being
seen as not opposing sexual violence a public relations nightmare.” 42
Assume, for a moment, that Melnick, Gersen, and Suk are correct—that
schools with meritorious defenses settle to avoid the public-relations and
other costs of being subject to an OCR investigation. Note that those costs—
and thus the incentive to knuckle under—would be exactly the same even if
the agency was not relying on subregulatory materials. In a world in which
OCR had not issued Dear Colleague Letters, guidance, and other such policy
pronouncements, it would still open investigations of schools that violated
agency leaders’ understandings of what the law required. Those investigations would still impose costs on their targets. And their targets would have
the same incentive to settle.
The only difference between a world with and a world without subregulatory guidance would be this: In a world with subregulatory guidance, institutions that are targets or potential targets of OCR investigations will know
how agency officials intend to resolve questions left open by the statute and
implementing regulations. In a world without subregulatory guidance, they
will not have that knowledge. 43 That means that they will not be able to
know in advance how to avoid an agency enforcement action—an ambiguity
that may lead overly cautious university bureaucrats to go farther than necessary to stay on the right side of the agency. 44 And they will not be as able to

40. P. 35; see also p. 40 (“Title IX’s central enforcement mechanism, the termination of
federal funds, has proved unworkable in practice.”).
41. P. 151; see also p. 45 (“Going through a lengthy investigation can be costly to an institution both financially and in terms of its reputation. That is why many colleges have agreed
to follow OCR sexual harassment guidance even when it differs substantially from the Supreme
Court’s interpretation of Title IX.”).
42. Gersen & Suk, supra note 31, at 909.
43. See, e.g., Emerson, supra note 34, at 2180–81 (“If the agency concludes from its enforcement experience that recipients’ obligation to establish an equitable grievance procedure
requires the use of a preponderance of the evidence standard in that procedure, merely precatory language would fail to disclose that conclusion. Parties would be unaware of the agency’s
true position—that such evidentiary standards are required under the regulation.” (footnote
omitted)).
44. For an argument that uncertainty leads to overdeterrence under plausible conditions, see John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance with
Legal Standards, 70 VA. L. REV. 965 (1984). For an argument that overreaching in the applica-
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detect instances in which the agency is operating under an interpretation
that deviates from its usual understanding of the statute and regulations. A
world without subregulatory guidance is thus not likely to address the problem Melnick, Gersen, and Suk identify—but it is likely to be both less efficient and less transparent.
Perhaps, though, courts will defer to subregulatory guidance when interpreting Title IX. If courts feel bound to defer to that guidance, then OCR
will be able to effectively make new law without going through the noticeand-comment process. 45 Auer v. Robbins requires courts to defer to agencies’
interpretations of their own regulations unless those interpretations are
“plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.” 46 As Melnick makes
clear, though, the courts have not reliably deferred to the interpretations
OCR has issued through subregulatory means (pp. 15, 40, 45, 226). These
courts have notably included the Supreme Court, which has twice refused to
rely on the agency’s pronouncements in interpreting Title IX. 47
Indeed, even in cases in which courts have cited doctrines of deference
in endorsing OCR’s interpretations, it is likely that they were not deferring to
agency decisions they believed to be questionable but reasonable; rather, they
were upholding agency decisions they agreed with on the merits. Melnick
himself notes the Gavin Grimm case as an example of this phenomenon
(pp. 233–34). There, a majority of the Fourth Circuit held that Title IX protected a transgender student’s right to use the restroom for the gender with
which he identified. 48 The court rested its holding on Auer deference to
OCR’s interpretation. 49 In accordance with the Fourth Circuit’s decision, the
district court issued a preliminary injunction requiring the school to permit
Grimm to use the appropriate restroom. 50 The Supreme Court then granted
certiorari to review the Fourth Circuit’s decision. 51 While the case was pending, the Trump Administration withdrew the guidance to which the lower
tion of Title IX has resulted from the actions of overly cautious university bureaucrats, rather
than overly aggressive enforcement by OCR, see Bagenstos, supra note 12.
45. See, e.g., Brief for the Cato Inst. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 14–
15, Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019) (No. 18-15), 2019 WL 460142 (arguing that this is
what OCR attempted to do in Title IX cases involving discrimination against transgender individuals); Jonathan H. Adler, Auer Evasions, 16 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 20–21 (2018) (same).
46. 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (quoting Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council,
490 U.S. 332, 359 (1989)).
47. See Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 178 (2005) (holding that Title
IX prohibits retaliation, and stating that “we do not rely on the Department of Education’s
regulation at all, because the statute itself contains the necessary prohibition”); Gebser v. Lago
Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998) (rejecting aided-by-the-agency-relationship standard for institutional liability that appeared in OCR guidance).
48. See G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 723 (4th Cir. 2016),
vacated and remanded, 137 S. Ct. 1239 (2017).
49. See id. at 717–24.
50. G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., No. 4:15CV54, 2016 WL 3581852
(E.D. Va. June 23, 2016), vacated, 853 F.3d 729 (4th Cir. 2017).
51. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. v. G.G. ex rel. Grimm, 137 S. Ct. 369 (2017).
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court had deferred. 52 The Supreme Court vacated the Fourth Circuit’s decision and remanded for further proceedings in light of the Trump Administration’s action. 53 On remand, the Fourth Circuit agreed to the parties’
stipulation to vacate the preliminary injunction. 54
In a concurrence to that decision, the judges who had ruled for Grimm
in the initial appeal despaired that “[t]oday, G.G. adds his name to the list of
plaintiffs whose struggle for justice has been delayed and rebuffed.” 55 They
compared Grimm to other “brave individuals—Dred Scott, Fred Korematsu,
Linda Brown, Mildred and Richard Loving, Edie Windsor, and Jim Obergefell, to name just a few—who refused to accept quietly the injustices that
were perpetuated against them.” 56 They described Grimm’s case as being
“about a boy asking his school to treat him just like any other boy”; “about
protecting the rights of transgender people in public spaces and not forcing
them to exist on the margins”; and “about governmental validation of the
existence and experiences of transgender people, as well as the simple recognition of their humanity.” 57 And they said that Grimm’s suit had “demonstrated that some entities will not protect the rights of others unless
compelled to do so.” 58
“In this statement,” Melnick concludes, “Judges Davis and Floyd make it
clear that they were not simply deferring to OCR’s expertise in the original
case”; rather, their original decision reflected their own view of the scope of
equal rights protected by Title IX (p. 246). That conclusion is quite plausible.
When one reads their concurring opinion, which is driven by a certainty in
the rightness of Grimm’s cause, it is hard to believe that Judges Davis and
Floyd would have ruled against Grimm even if OCR had been silent.
On a very plausible reading, then, Auer deference did not make a difference to the Fourth Circuit’s resolution of Gavin Grimm’s case—even though
that court’s initial decision purported to rely entirely on deference. If the
Fourth Circuit’s action was not unusual, and courts are using agency pronouncements as mere decoration for decisions they would have made anyway, then there is particular reason not to worry that OCR will bootstrap
new legal requirements through the promulgation of unaccountable guidance. Although some early work concluded that courts treated the Auer doc-

52. Ariane de Vogue et al., Trump Administration Withdraws Federal Protections for
Transgender Students, CNN (Feb. 23, 2017, 10:16 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/02/22
/politics/doj-withdraws-federal-protections-on-transgender-bathrooms-in-schools/index.html
[https://perma.cc/C4FT-W3J7].
53. See Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. v. G.G. ex rel. Grimm, 137 S. Ct. 1239 (2017).
54. See G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 853 F.3d 729 (4th Cir. 2017).
55. Id. at 730 (Davis, J., joined by Floyd, J., concurring).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 731.
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trine as a virtual guarantee of a government victory, 59 more recent empirical
analyses suggest that Auer is no stronger than any other deference doctrine. 60
And the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Kisor v. Wilkie, which purported to reaffirm Auer deference to agencies’ interpretations of their own regulations, is likely to weaken Auer even further. In Kisor, the Court emphasized
that the Auer doctrine has a narrow scope, one that “gives agencies their due,
while also allowing—indeed, obligating—courts to perform their reviewing
and restraining functions.” 61
There are other protections against potential OCR bootstrapping. As
Melnick notes (pp. 51–52), the Supreme Court’s decision in Alexander v.
Sandoval holds that there is no private right of action to enforce legal rules
that derive only from regulations rather than from the statute itself. 62 That
holding significantly limits the ability of OCR to impose new legal obligations—at least to the extent that those obligations will be enforced by private
parties. Perhaps more important, because Title IX was enacted pursuant to
the spending power, the Court has insisted that any obligations imposed by
the statute have been made clear to schools at the time they accepted federal
funds. 63 As a result, OCR will not be able to “surpris[e] participating States
with postacceptance or ‘retroactive’ conditions.” 64
Subregulatory pronouncements simply are not very strong tools for an
agency to use to entrench its views of the law. And, indeed, reliance on such
pronouncements has been the “undoing” of the Obama Administration’s aggressive policies on sexual harassment and transgender rights. 65 It was precisely because OCR issued those policies through relatively informal means

59. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO.
L.J. 1083, 1142 (2008).
60. See Cynthia Barmore, Auer in Action: Deference After Talk America, 76 OHIO ST.
L.J. 813 (2015); Richard J. Pierce, Jr. & Joshua Weiss, An Empirical Study of Judicial Review of
Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 515 (2011); William Yeatman, Note,
An Empirical Defense of Auer Step Zero, 106 GEO. L.J. 515 (2018). See generally Nicholas R.
Parrillo, Federal Agency Guidance and the Power to Bind: An Empirical Study of Agencies and
Industries, 36 YALE J. ON REG. 165, 213–14 (2019) (“[J]udicial deference to guidance is not as
strong as we might assume. For one thing, agency win rates under Auer have fallen in recent
years, so they are comparable with those under the alternative deference regime of Chevron,
perhaps indicating that Auer is not some all-powerful government weapon. Plus, a recent study
indicates that, in the U.S. circuit courts, over half the opinions reviewing guidance documents’
interpretations of statutes or legislative rules do so not under the strongly deferential Chevron
framework or the supposedly super-deferential Auer framework, but instead under the Skidmore framework, which offers the weakest deference of the three.” (footnotes omitted)).
61. Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2415 (2019).
62. 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
63. See, e.g., Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 287 (1998). For my
effort to untangle current Spending Clause law, see Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Anti-leveraging
Principle and the Spending Clause After NFIB, 101 GEO. L.J. 861 (2013).
64. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 25 (1981).
65. Adler, supra note 45, at 23–24.
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that the Trump Administration was able to quickly reverse them. Had the
Obama-era agency used more formal notice-and-comment rulemaking, the
succeeding administration would have likely been forced to go through its
own time-and-resource-consuming rulemaking process to shift course.
B. “Institutional Leapfrogging”
What about the “institutional leapfrogging” critique? Have administrators and courts been able to make major changes in the law and society, all
while hiding the nature and scope of their innovations, by “extend[ing] regulation in a large number of small steps, with each claiming to defer to the
other”? (p. 251). Melnick describes the process of “institutional leapfrogging” as follows:
[T]he courts defer to agency guidelines while incrementally expanding upon them; the agency then argues that the judiciary has endorsed its reading
of the statute, emboldening it to be a little more aggressive; and the court
then incorporates this administrative iteration into its interpretation of the
law. Each denies adding anything new while together they build a more
demanding regulatory program. (p. 117)

Because it is difficult for observers to follow each step of a policy’s evolution,
Melnick argues that this process of incremental expansion “provid[es] political camouflage to these policy innovations” (p. 251).
An initial problem with this argument is that it doesn’t fit Melnick’s data. Only one of the three case studies—athletics—seems even close to involving a pattern of “institutional leapfrogging” as Melnick defines it. In the area
of campus sexual harassment and assault, OCR repeatedly found itself in
conflict with the courts. In its 1998 Gebser decision, 66 the Supreme Court refused to defer to the standard for institutional liability that appeared in
OCR’s 1997 sexual harassment guidance. As Melnick notes, when the
Obama Administration’s OCR returned to this field in 2011, it “decided that
the Court’s interpretation of Title IX was too conservative” and “staked out a
much more aggressive stance,” which “meant that OCR could not count on
federal courts to enforce its guidelines through private suits” (p. 153). Indeed, the courts pushed back against OCR’s actions by holding that universities had denied accused students due process by adopting the procedures
suggested by the agency’s guidance (p. 152). And, in any event, the Obamaera OCR made no attempt to hide its newly aggressive stance toward rooting
out sexual harassment and assault. 67
In the area of transgender rights, any effort at “institutional leapfrogging” was smothered in its crib. Here’s what happened: In January 2015,

66. Gebser, 524 U.S. 274.
67. See p. 198 (comparing earlier OCR efforts in this area, which took place “with little
fanfare,” with the issuance of guidance documents in 2010, 2011, and 2014, which “received
the full blessing of the Obama administration, with Vice President Biden often playing a leading role”).
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OCR’s Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy sent a letter to a
transgender rights advocate. That letter said, among other things, that
“[w]hen a school elects to separate or treat students differently on the basis
of sex,” it “generally must treat transgender students consistent with their
gender identity.” 68 The next year, in its opinion in the Gavin Grimm case,
the Fourth Circuit deferred to the interpretation set forth in that letter. 69
And less than a month after the Fourth Circuit’s decision, OCR (together
with the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice) issued a more
extensive Dear Colleague Letter on the rights of transgender students. 70 The
Dear Colleague Letter, which reaffirmed the 2015 letter but addressed a
broader variety of questions regarding transgender students’ rights, said that
its interpretation was “consistent with courts’ and other agencies’ interpretations of Federal laws prohibiting sex discrimination.” 71 In a footnote appended to the passage, the Letter cited the Fourth Circuit’s decision in the
Grimm case, as well as a half dozen cases brought under other federal statutes, and administrative pronouncements by the Departments of Justice and
Labor, as well as the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, on
transgender rights. 72
Given the realities of drafting, gaining approval for, and publishing an
interagency document like this, the Dear Colleague Letter was surely in the
works well before the Fourth Circuit’s decision. But the Dear Colleague Letter’s citation of that decision makes it just barely plausible to call the Letter
an example of “institutional leapfrogging.” The problem is what happened
next. In October 2016, the Supreme Court granted certiorari. 73 In February
2017, DOJ and OCR withdrew the May 2016 Dear Colleague Letter, as well
as the January 2015 letter to which the Fourth Circuit had deferred. 74 Any
game of leapfrog had been reversed. And it was reversed precisely because
the agencies had never hidden—nor made any particular effort to hide—
their innovations in the law from the public. Melnick calls this
68. Letter from James A. Ferg-Cadima, Acting Deputy Assistant Sec’y for Policy, Office
for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., to Emily T. Prince 2 (Jan. 7, 2015),
http://www.bricker.com/documents/misc/transgender_student_restroom_access_1-2015.pdf
[https://perma.cc/B5SJ-QMGR].
69. See G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 723 (4th Cir. 2016),
vacated and remanded, 137 S. Ct. 1239 (2017).
70. See Catherine E. Lhamon, Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Educ. &
Vanita Gupta, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen. for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
Dear Colleague Letter on Transgender Students (May 13, 2016), https://www2
.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201605-title-ix-transgender.pdf [https://perma
.cc/T28Y-XUJC].
71. Id. at 2.
72. See id. at 6 n.5.
73. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. v. G.G. ex rel. Grimm, 137 S. Ct. 369 (2017).
74. See supra text accompanying notes 48–53; see also Andrew Mytelka, Trump Administration Rescinds Obama-Era Guidance on Transgender Students, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Feb.
22, 2017, 11:00 PM), https://www.chronicle.com/blogs/ticker/trump-administration-rescindsobama-era-guidance-on-transgender-students/117025 [https://perma.cc/7GZQ-F3DX].
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“[i]nstitutional [l]eapfrogging—[w]ith a [t]wist” (p. 152). The twist is that it
didn’t happen.
What about athletics? Here at least we can see a pattern of OCR and the
courts moving in the same direction across multiple administrations, though
I doubt Melnick’s “leapfrogging” metaphor is really apt. In 1975, OCR issued
regulations to implement Title IX. Those regulations included a requirement
that a school “which operates or sponsors interscholastic, intercollegiate,
club or intramural athletics shall provide equal athletic opportunity for
members of both sexes.” 75 The regulation said that OCR would “consider” a
number of “factors” in determining whether the “equal athletic opportunity”
requirement was satisfied. 76 Those factors included “[w]hether the selection
of sports and levels of competition effectively accommodate the interests and
abilities of members of both sexes.” 77
In 1979, OCR issued a “Policy Interpretation” that elaborated on its
1975 regulations. 78 The Policy Interpretation established a three-part test for
assessing compliance with the regulation’s “effectively accommodate the interests and abilities” language. The 1979 pronouncement provided that
“[c]ompliance will be assessed in any one of the following ways”:
(1) Whether intercollegiate level participation opportunities for male
and female students are provided in numbers substantially proportionate to their respective enrollments; or
(2) Where the members of one sex have been and are underrepresented among intercollegiate athletes, whether the institution can
show a history and continuing practice of program expansion
which is demonstrably responsive to the developing interest and
abilities of the members of that sex; or
(3) Where the members of one sex are underrepresented among intercollegiate athletes, and the institution cannot show a continuing practice of program expansion such as that cited above,
whether it can be demonstrated that the interests and abilities of
the members of that sex have been fully and effectively accommodated by the present program. 79

It was only after that point that the courts entered the picture. In 1993,
the First Circuit issued its first of two opinions in the leading case of Cohen
v. Brown University. 80 In a round of budget cuts in 1991, Brown had demoted its women’s volleyball and gymnastics teams, as well as its men’s golf and

75. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c) (2018).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972; a Policy Interpretation; Title IX
and Intercollegiate Athletics, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413 (Dec. 11, 1979).
79. Id. at 71,418.
80. 991 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1993).
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water polo teams, from varsity to club status. 81 Those cuts “took substantially
more dollars from the women’s athletic budget than from the men’s budget,
but did not materially affect the athletic opportunity ratios”—female athletes
retained just over one-third of the slots for varsity athletes, in a school in
which women made up 48% of the student population. 82
In its 1993 Brown University decision, the First Circuit upheld a preliminary injunction barring the school from cutting the women’s teams. In considering the “likelihood of success” factor, the court explained that Brown
could not satisfy the first or second prong of the three-part test, because intercollegiate athletic opportunities were not offered to women in proportion
to their enrollment and because the school had stopped adding women’s
teams several years earlier. 83 That left the third prong: “whether it can be
demonstrated that the interests and abilities of the members of that sex have
been fully and effectively accommodated by the present program.” 84 And
Brown could not satisfy that prong, because it had cut two robust women’s
teams—cuts that left “the interests and abilities” of the women who had been
on those teams without “full[] and effective[] accommodat[ion].” 85
On remand, the district court found Brown liable for violating Title IX. 86
In 1996 the First Circuit affirmed the judgment of liability, largely based on
the analysis in its 1993 preliminary injunction opinion. 87 While the university’s merits appeal to the First Circuit was pending, OCR issued a new “Clarification Memorandum” elaborating the three-part test. 88 In a passage that
seemed to be inspired by the Brown University case, the Clarification Memorandum said, “If an institution has recently eliminated a viable team from
the intercollegiate program, OCR will find that there is sufficient interest,
ability, and available competition to sustain an intercollegiate team in that
sport unless an institution can provide strong evidence that interest, ability,
or available competition no longer exists.” 89 The First Circuit’s 1996 opinion
did refer to this passage, but only after noting that its 1993 decision had engaged in the same analysis. 90

81. See Cohen, 911 F.2d at 892.
82. Id.
83. See id. at 903.
84. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972; a Policy Interpretation; Title IX and
Intercollegiate Athletics, 44 Fed. Reg. at 71,418.
85. See Cohen, 991 F.2d at 904.
86. See Cohen v. Brown Univ., 879 F. Supp. 185 (D.R.I. 1995), aff’d in part, rev’d in part,
101 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1186 (1997).
87. See Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1186
(1997).
88. Clarification of Intercollegiate Athletics Policy Guidance: The Three-Part Test, U.S.
DEP’T EDUC. (Jan. 16, 1996), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/clarific.html
[https://perma.cc/G65R-RH5M].
89. Id.
90. See Cohen, 101 F.3d at 180.
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Was this episode an example of “institutional leapfrogging” as Melnick
defines it? Superficially, at least, the signs point to yes: OCR issued a pronouncement in 1979, the First Circuit relied on it in 1993, OCR then referred
to the 1993 decision in a new pronouncement in 1996, and the First Circuit
then referred to the new pronouncement in its own 1996 decision. But did
each step in this process represent an expansion of the prior law? And were
those incremental expansions cloaked in a false modesty that hid their effects
from the public? There the argument gets a lot weaker.
Start with the 1993 First Circuit decision. Arguing that the 1993 decision
represented an incremental expansion of Title IX, Melnick points to the
court’s discussion of a particular question about how to interpret the third
prong of OCR’s three-part test: In deciding whether “the interests and abilities of the members of [the “underrepresented”] sex have been fully and effectively accommodated by the present program,” 91 should courts measure
accommodation in absolute or relative terms? 92 That is, should they consider
whether the defendant university has fully accommodated the interests and
abilities of women—regardless of whether it has done the same for men? Or
should they instead decide whether the university has accommodated the interests and abilities of women to the same extent as it has accommodated the
interests and abilities of men? The plaintiffs in the Brown case took the absolute view; the university took the relative view. In each of its two decisions,
the First Circuit agreed with the plaintiffs. 93
Was the First Circuit’s resolution of this question an innovation? To the
contrary, it appears to have represented the most straightforward interpretation of the language in the 1979 Policy Interpretation. Nothing in prong
three’s language suggests that a court should consider whether the interests
and abilities of women have been satisfied to the same extent as those of
men. Rather, the language is phrased in absolute terms: whether “the interests and abilities of the members of that sex”—that is, the “underrepresented” sex—“have been fully and effectively accommodated by the present
program.” 94
Brown argued—and Melnick seems to agree 95—that the full-andeffective-accommodation language should be read in light of the preamble to
the 1979 Policy Interpretation. That preamble stated that “the governing
principle in this area is that the athletic interests and abilities of male and

91. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972; a Policy Interpretation; Title IX and
Intercollegiate Athletics, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413, 71,418 (Dec. 11, 1979).
92. See pp. 112–14.
93. See Cohen, 101 F.3d at 176; Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 899–900 (1st Cir.
1993).
94. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972; a Policy Interpretation; Title IX and
Intercollegiate Athletics, 44 Fed. Reg. at 71,418.
95. See p. 112.
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female students must be equally effectively accommodated.” 96 But even if the
overall regulation aims at equal accommodation of interests, it does not at all
follow that each subpart of the three-part test must require proof of relative
interest. And the First Circuit’s interpretation reflects the most natural reading of the Policy Interpretation’s operative language.
Still, let’s grant that the First Circuit moved the ball forward—by making
clear that the courts would defer to the Policy Interpretation, and by adopting the absolute, rather than the relative, reading of the third prong. That’s
just the everyday work that courts do—resolving legal questions and applying the law to the facts. “Institutional leapfrogging” would seem to require at
least another step, one that extends beyond the prior interpretations while
downplaying the extent of its innovation. For that step, Melnick highlights
OCR’s 1996 Clarification Memorandum.
Melnick identifies three aspects of the 1996 memorandum that, in his
view, represented an innovation. First, he says that the “most controversial
feature” of that memorandum “was its description of Prong One as a ‘safe
harbor’ ” (p. 117). But the text of the 1979 Policy Interpretation makes clear
that the first prong was always a safe harbor: Where “intercollegiate level
participation opportunities for male and female students [were] provided in
numbers substantially proportionate to their respective enrollments,” the
three-part test provided that a school would be in compliance. 97 By their
terms, the second and third prongs provided that they did not apply unless
“the members of one sex are underrepresented among intercollegiate athletes.” 98 Second, he says that the 1996 memorandum “tightened Prong Two
by requiring ‘actual program expansion,’ that is, adding more women’s
teams” (p. 118). But, again, there was nothing new about this requirement.
The second prong, as it appeared in the 1979 OCR document, already explicitly required a school to “show a history and continuing practice of program
expansion.” 99 Finally, he notes that the 1996 memorandum endorsed the
First Circuit’s absolute rather than relative reading of the third prong. 100 But
that is, by definition, not an expansion of the 1993 First Circuit decision.
And, as I have shown, it is questionable whether the 1993 decision represented an innovation in any event.
Melnick makes no serious claim that the 1996 First Circuit decision expanded the interpretation of Title IX beyond what appeared in the 1993 First
Circuit Decision and the 1996 Clarification Memorandum. He does argue
that OCR later issued two pronouncements that moved the law forward. The
first, a Dear Colleague Letter in 1998, “demanded that scholarship money
awarded to male and female athletes be within 1 percent of the proportion of

96. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972; a Policy Interpretation; Title IX and
Intercollegiate Athletics, 44 Fed. Reg. at 71,414.
97. Id. at 71,418.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. See p. 118.

1072

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 118:1053

male and female varsity athletes at the school” (p. 119). The second, in 2010,
reversed Bush Administration efforts to slightly soften the third prong of the
three-part test and instead “requir[ed] schools to use ‘a broad range of indicators’ to prove that they have ‘fully’ accommodated the interests and abilities of their female students.” 101 But even if we grant that these steps reprerepresented an expansion beyond prior OCR positions—and I think
Melnick’s argument in that regard is overstated—they represent ordinary efforts by an administrative agency to increase its reach. They did not respond
in any particularly direct way to the prior judicial pronouncements. Nor
were the agency’s policy innovations, such as they were, hidden from the
public. To the contrary, OCR announced its 2010 Dear Colleague Letter with
great publicity: “The new policy was unveiled by Secretary Duncan and Vice
President Biden before a large crowd in a college basketball arena” (p. 124).
And, as I noted above, the aggressive use of Title IX to promote women’s
sports has proven extremely popular politically. 102 The “leapfrogging” metaphor seems strained.
CONCLUSION
The issues OCR has addressed in administering Title IX are among the
most contentious in our polity. Contrary to the suggestion in Melnick’s
book, the agency has not hidden its resolution of those issues under obscure
bureaucratic forms while the public has been left in the dark. Rather, OCR
has been at the center of a robust public debate. That is not undemocratic.
That is what democracy looks like.

101. P. 124 (quoting Russlynn Ali, Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights, Office for Civil Rights,
U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Dear Colleague Letter on Guidance on Accommodating Students’ Athletic
Interests and Abilities: Standard for Part Three of the “Three-Part Test” 4 (Apr. 20, 2010),
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-20100420.pdf
[https://perma.cc
/QK8C-YHGH]).
102. See supra text accompanying notes 13–18.

